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AI SPACE: APPROACHES AND FEATURES OF LEGAL REGULATION

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ABSTRACT

The article examines the specific features of legal regulation of the artificial intelligence domain within the framework of the contemporary information society. The study argues for a human-centered approach to the development of legal mechanisms for governing AI, which must remain consistent with general legal principles and the protection of human rights and freedoms. Special attention is paid to the issues of legal provision and legal intervention in the AI sphere, along with the potential risks associated with the emergence of a digital dictatorship. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of further academic and normative efforts aimed at regulating the AI domain.

KEYWORDS

AI Domain, Legal Regulation, Human-Centered Approach, Protection of Human Rights, Information Society, Digital Dictatorship, Legal Provision, Legal Intervention

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Problem statement. Starting this article, I would like to make a few remarks right away. Firstly, understanding the complexity of the scientific problem, as well as its multivariateness, in terms of definitions, polystructural conclusions, we would like to emphasize that, in our opinion, there are certain complications of the relevant problems, which are not least related to the ethical and legal paradigm. Thus, in most publications of many domestic authors, as well as foreign language publications, It is emphasized that this problem is complex, contradictory, sometimes threatening, which may raise certain doubts: whether an ordinary person needs it and to what extent.

To answer these and other questions with confidence or at least with a relative degree of confidence, we propose focusing on the origins, meaning and necessity of legal regulation as such. We need this to understand the spatial-temporal characteristics of AI and their interaction and coexistence with various dimensions of human life, including, and perhaps first, with legal ones.

The purpose of the article is to emphasize that the formation and development of the global space of artificial intelligence requires ensuring proper legal regulation both at the international and national levels.

Presentation of the material. As you know, legal regulation is a special regulation of social relations, a system of various legal means: norms of law, legal facts, legal relations, establishment of legal and legal capacity of citizens, their legal status as a whole, determination of the competence of state bodies, legal status of public organizations, legal entities and other subjects of social relations – that is, all the legal reality that surrounds a person throughout his life.

The category of "legal regulation" expresses the dynamic essence of the entire legal superstructure, it characterizes the active and creative side of law, reflects the process of its transformation from possibility to reality. The process of legal regulation is aimed at a wide range of subjects of social relations (state, nations, organizations, state bodies, citizens) [1].

We emphasize that we are talking about human communication, forms of life: from concluding agreements to other important behavioral acts regulated by the current law. That is, we emphasize once again that we are talking about the legal regulation of socio-legal principles created and supported by the subject of legal relations. Therefore, the uncertainty of the role (both subject and the object of legal relations) affects the fact that AI generates, unfortunately, not only a doctrinal contradiction about the superiority of the usefulness or threats of the use of AI, but also a practical conscious or unconscious blocking, inhibition of the "legalization" of AI space in law.

Legal regulation can be characterized as a special formalized method of state regulation of the actions of subjects of law to direct their behavior in accordance with the interests of citizens, society and the state. In this context, it is necessary to answer the question, both in the scientific community and outside it, to what extent the use of AI is seen as a conductor of the interests of representatives of society and the individual. Constantly, along with the benefits of using technical AI tools, there are questions related to challenges and threats. Moreover, challenges and threats are sometimes related to those fantastic publications and works of cinema that we all know about since childhood. It seems that this situation, firstly, is produced by insufficient, ineffective (low-quality) legal regulation of the field of AI activity.

Continuing further the well-known findings on legal regulation, we note that it requires a comprehensive study of the relevant components in their inseparable interaction, i.e. as an integral system consisting of certain links that are in interaction and each of them follows from the previous one. That is why legal regulation involves a systematic analysis, as well as the creation of a system of legal categories that reflects the multifaceted process of regulation. Turning to the legal regulation of AI as a systemic entity, we note one of the most pressing issues of scientific grade in this area, namely the creation of the Digital Code, which also causes a lot of discussions in the context of its construction, functioning and legal nature as such [2].

We also note the interdependence of elements of legal regulation in the context of the development of a particular national legal system. Therefore, there may be some rejection by individuals or even social groups of AI, and therefore its legal regulation within the framework of the same national legal system, due to the fact that for the time being, such legal regulation is somewhat separate, or only tangential to the general legal doctrinal principles (ideas), as well as to the practical implementation of certain legal guidelines.

Thus, we can note that the separation of the legal regulation of AI from the general canons and mechanisms of legal regulation also determines the separation of its perception.

The system of legal regulation is characterized by the presence of various functional connections: direct (norm of law – legal fact – legal relations) and reverse (legal relations – norm of law) [3]. At the same time,

according to modern development trends, some authors suggest considering AI as a legal phenomenon that can have the significance of each of the above segments separately or simultaneously. Without denying the futuristic forecasts of the development of AI in space, we currently propose to proceed from the position where AI functions inseparably from a person and his legitimate interests and therefore cannot be responsible for the reproduction of all these components of the functional connection.

As already mentioned, the system of legal regulation consists of norms of law, legal facts, legal relations, as well as acts of implementation. The listed elements do not exhaust all forms and means of legal regulation. At the same time, the interdependence of individual elements of the system of legal regulation does not deprive them of relative independence. Firstly, the very fact of the separate existence of a link of legal regulation, whose role AI can play (for example, a legal fact) already testifies to the totality of its individual features, which distinguishes it from other links. Secondly, there are a certain number of links of legal regulation that allow us to talk about the system, about a certain set of elements of this process. The appropriate embodiment of all links exclusively in the "person of AI" calls into question the system as such, and therefore in the future may lead to destruction, collision, unjustified increase in the regulatory framework and other dysfunctions of legal regulation as such.

The sphere of legal regulation can also include the promotion of law and verification of the expediency and effectiveness of legal norms. It should be borne in mind that legal regulation is only one of many aspects of the operation of law in society. It characterizes both special legal and informational, orientation or motivational influence on the behaviour and activities of subjects of law.

Communication, as a phenomenon of social development and the phenomenon of social existence, unfortunately, occupies a socio-political platform that has not yet been sufficiently studied from the doctrinal review. Although this type of communication is extremely important, considering both the functioning and the protection and protection of social human rights [4].

In our opinion, it is necessary to consider the communication potentials of law as a certain segment of the functioning of the information space and the information society, which can also be considered an integral part of democratic transformations [5].

It is no secret that the information society hides several dangerous trends, in particular:

- 1) the real probability of destruction of the private life of individuals and the activities of organizations because of the influence of penetrating information technologies;
- 2) the presence of a problem of selecting reliable information;
- 3) the need to prevent the circulation of "harmful" information, in particular that which contains elements of violence, extremist materials, materials contrary to public morality;
- 4) the growing threat of the possibility of manipulating people's consciousness due to the increased simultaneous influence of various forms and media;
- 5) the need to ensure proper adaptation of people to the specific environment of the information society, which every year demonstrates increasingly branching and structured.

Thus, we would like to note that the study of the information society, in particular the AI space, and related phenomena of social reality can be carried out using various approaches, in particular: socio-cultural, civilizational, structural-functional, comparative, normative, etc. However, in modern conditions, in our opinion, one of the most important approaches to the study of this complex phenomenon is precisely the socio-legal one, which allows you to formally determine certain aspects that develop in the field of information circulation and the active functioning of AI space.

Communicative properties belong to many institutions, which can be attributed to universal human heritage: civil society, morality, state, law, social policy, etc., as phenomena of social reality. The communicative component is a necessary condition for political processes, legal regulation, ultimately overcoming social conflicts, reaching a compromise, functioning and development of civil society, as well as a democratic social state governed by the rule of law. Today, it is impossible to complain about the complete lack of scientific developments, scientific achievements in the field of communication studies and such. However, it is the legal context of this problem, unfortunately, that is not sufficiently presented and has begun to be intensively worked out in modern legal science only recently. However, modern society, of course, considers science to be one of its "pillars" on which it is based, and therefore science, which accumulates knowledge about the nature and features of space AI and its development by law.

Communication is the process of information exchange that takes place in any society. The activities of people, the creation of cultural heritage, the corresponding sources of law are the transmission and perception of certain signals (messages). The communication process is a property of many complex systems, therefore,

when thinking about society, the term "social communication" is usually used. Social communication includes several mandatory components (Table 1):

- 1) subjects of communication (individuals, groups, institutions);
- 2) means of communication;
- 3) the content of communication, certain meaningful meanings transmitted during interaction;
- 4) communicative environment (AI space), where information is exchanged;
- 5) communication is not only the exchange of information, but also a process during which subjects influence each other's behaviour.

Thus, it is not the phenomenon of communication itself, but its new forms that contribute to evolution in any sphere of human life.

Table 1. Types and roles of classification

Dimension	Main types / roles	Explored
Scale	interpersonal, group, mass, network	[6, 7, 8]
Direction	one-sided (informational influence), two-way (interaction, dialogue)	[9, 10, 11]
Environment	offline, media, digital/network platforms	[12,13,14]
Functions	informational, organizational, identification, influence, stabilization	[15, 16,17]

The regulation of social relations, their consolidation and protection is the most important social task and purpose of law. The implementation of this function, the solution of these important tasks gives various (rather contradictory) social relations the necessary stability, creates conditions for the successful progressive development of the individual, the state and civil society.

In this context, the use of AI, in our opinion, will not cause heated discussions, but on the contrary can serve as a successful implementation tool.

The category of "legal support" also needs an independent discussion in the context of AI space. In the context of the above, it should be noted that the content of this category in some cases is identified with the concept of "law-making", although for the most part it is aimed at the process of realization of certain human and civil rights and freedoms, or rather, at the obligation of the state, represented by authorized subjects of power, as well as other certain subjects, to create all the necessary conditions for the comprehensive development of the individual, proper implementation by him of his rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. After all, as enshrined in Part 2 of Art. 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the establishment and provision of human rights and freedoms is the main duty of the state. Therefore, the state must ensure the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of subjects of law (also in the field of AI) who act as "consumers" of such services of the state. Moreover, in each context, subjects of law can be considered as "peculiar clients" for the format of legal support of which the state, its relevant bodies and institutions should be duly responsible.

Thus, ensuring human rights can be considered as a system of measures carried out by the state and civil society and aimed at the proper implementation and protection of human rights to prevent their violations. Accordingly, ensuring human rights is a complex legal phenomenon, the study of which is impossible without understanding several social phenomena and processes adjacent to it.

At the same time, in our opinion, the category of "legal support" is broader in its content than the concept of "ensuring human rights and freedoms". To substantiate this opinion, first, we note that the basis of legal support is the system of functions performed by law as a social regulator (for example, regulatory, protective, communicative, educational, evaluative, preventive, etc.). However, for the law to really embody these functions in everyday social practice, appropriate conditions and additional opportunities must be created that go beyond the formal consolidation of law at the level of laws and other normative legal acts. If we talk about the potential of AI today, then the subject of such support is primarily the state, the apparatus of which must create all the necessary conditions of socio-economic, political, organizational, ideological and other nature for the normal functioning of law in society.

Therefore, legal support can be considered as a process that guarantees the effective fulfilment of the goals of legal regulation; Legal support includes a set of not only relevant legal components, but also specific social factors, circumstances, processes, etc., which mediate the action of legal norms and constitute a connection between law and certain social relations. After all, the functional purpose and saturation of law is revealed precisely in the content of certain actual social relations, the specific rights and obligations of their

participants, the state of their will and consciousness, etc. In this regard, law, being a social phenomenon, cannot but consider the relevant factors, circumstances and processes that can have both positive and negative impact on the implementation of legal norms.

Therefore, legal support is a system of legal and other means by which subjects of law can achieve their goals, satisfy their interests, exercise their rights, etc. The system of such legal means is, in fact, legal regulation and its inherent special legal means of specific influence on society (norms of law, acts of implementation of rights and obligations, means of coercive nature, etc.). Other means of legal support include organizational, material, ideological, personnel and other means, the presence of which provides a real opportunity to effectively implement legal norms and achieve specific socially useful results of legal regulation [18].

Within the framework of research on legal support, particularly the human-centered dimension of this concept, I would like to devote a few words to the category of legal intervention or the category of "extrajudicial interference", their differences in the context of ensuring human rights and freedoms. This question arises during the development of a discussion of the category of "digital dictatorship", which, accordingly, can and does violate the rights and legitimate interests of a person. So, returning to our discussion, legal interference is an interference under certain conditions, which will be considered, by the state, representatives of civil society or third parties, about the rights and freedoms of citizens within the limits established by law. In addition, it should be noted right away that legal interference cannot take place even if there is a legitimate goal, as one that violates the principle of the rule of law, the principle of respect for human rights, the principle of respect for honour and dignity, etc. This statement requires special attention during martial law, state of emergency, interference in private life, medical intervention, economic sphere, etc.

One of the central aspects in this context, which I would like to emphasize, in all possible cases, is the concept of proportionality: the "balance of interference" cannot exceed the very purpose of law as the highest ideal for the protection of human rights, freedoms and legitimate interests, which also meets the existing standards covered in the positions of the European Court of Human Rights.

At the same time, the human-centered dimension of AI should take into account those ambiguous aspects caused by its activities, such as changing ideas about the generation of human rights, the need to develop its own national strategy with a conditional division into realistic, successful, conditionally successful, ultimately evolutionary understanding of the nature of collective and individual human rights [19]. That is, the vision of the legitimate interests of a person as the highest social value requires doctrinal understanding, including the further development of the problems of legal regulation of space III.

Human-centered understanding of the legal personality of artificial intelligence.

In the context of the development of legal regulation of artificial intelligence space, special attention needs to be paid to the issue of the legal personality of algorithmic systems, which in modern legal doctrine acquires not only debatable, but also ideological significance. The human-centric approach, which is the basis of the concept of legal regulation of AI, provides for the unconditional preservation of the priority of the human person as the central value of law, the only full-fledged carrier of legal personality, rights and obligations, as well as sources of legal responsibility [20,21]. That is why any attempts to endow artificial intelligence with an autonomous legal status should be evaluated through the prism of the rule of law, respect for human dignity and preventing the substitution of a human being by a technological tool [22].

In the context of the rapid development of algorithmic systems, there is an increasing temptation to consider artificial intelligence as a quasi-subject of legal relations, capable of independent decision-making and influence on social processes. However, this approach requires a deep critical rethinking from the standpoint of the human-centered doctrine of law [23]. Artificial intelligence, even under conditions of a high level of autonomy of functioning, does not possess its own legal will, moral autonomy, ethical self-determination and the ability to realize the legal consequences of its actions, which objectively makes it impossible to recognize it as an independent subject of law in the classical sense [24]. Therefore, legal regulation should proceed from the presumption of human priority as a bearer of legal personality and responsibility, and algorithmic systems should be considered as complex technological tools integrated into human activity.

The human-centric dimension of legal regulation requires not only a formal denial of the autonomous legal personality of AI, but also the development of a legal system of guarantees that ensures constant human control over algorithmic processes. We are talking about the establishment of the principle of "a person in the decision-making circuit", the transparency of the functioning of models, the possibility of legal audit and the definition of clear boundaries of the permissible use of technology in the field of public and private legal relations [25]. In this context, AI should be considered as an element of the infrastructure of social and legal

communication, which is subject to regulation by the state and society to ensure a balance between innovation and human rights protection.

In this context, it is advisable to emphasize that legal personality in the digital environment cannot be transformed by mechanically transferring traditional legal categories to algorithmic systems without proper doctrinal understanding and reassessment of their content from the standpoint of human-centeredness. Modern digital reality, despite the rapid growth of the role of artificial intelligence in decision-making, does not change the fundamental provision of law that it is a person who remains the center of legal reality, the subject of expression of will and the bearer of responsibility. On the contrary, the law must ensure the preservation of the anthropocentric nature of legal relations, within which any actions of AI are considered as an indirect continuation of human activity — the developer, operator, owner or user of the technology [26].

This approach is of particular importance in the context of the growing role of automated systems in the field of public administration, economic activity and social communication, where the risk of substitution of human responsibility for algorithmic processes is becoming more obvious. The human-centric dimension of legal regulation requires the establishment of clear boundaries for the use of AI, which would prevent the normative devaluation of the categories of the subject of law and legal responsibility [27]. In this sense, law is intended to fulfil not only a regulatory but also a protective function, preventing situations in which the technical complexity of algorithms is used as a basis to avoid the legal evaluation of human actions.

The preservation of the anthropocentric nature of legal relations contributes to the formation of a stable model of legal regulation focused on the protection of human rights and freedoms, strengthening trust in digital technologies and ensuring a balance between innovation and legal certainty. It is this model that avoids regulatory uncertainty, minimizes the risks of delegating legal responsibility to technical systems, and ensures that AI development is consistent with the fundamental values of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

Legal regulation in this area should be aimed not at constructing new subjects of legal relations, but at determining the boundaries of the use of technology by humans and in the interests of humans. Algorithmic systems can perform the functions of a legal fact, a decision-making tool or an information environment of interaction, but their legal role must remain derived from human activity. This approach avoids regulatory conflicts and prevents the delegation of legal responsibility to technological objects.

At the same time, the human-centric model of legal regulation implies the need to consolidate systemic and multi-level guarantees of human control over the functioning of AI, which should be considered as a key element of legal support of human rights and freedoms in the digital environment. Such control is not limited only to technical supervision of algorithms, but covers a set of legal, organizational and ethical mechanisms aimed at ensuring transparency of decision-making, clarity of the logic of the functioning of models and the possibility of their independent legal audit. It is about the formation of a legal regime within which a person has the right to know about the use of algorithmic systems, receive explanations about automated decisions, as well as effectively appeal them in case of violation of legitimate interests.

The human-centered approach in this aspect also provides for the consolidation of legal responsibility of the entities that create, implement or apply artificial intelligence systems, since it is the person who remains the central link in legal regulation. Such responsibility should include not only the consequences of the misuse of technology, but also the obligation to ensure an appropriate level of security, non-discrimination and compliance of algorithms with the fundamental principles of law. As a result, conditions are being created under which technological progress is combined with guarantees of legal certainty, strengthening trust in digital tools and establishing a human-centric paradigm for the development of artificial intelligence.

The development of artificial intelligence as a tool for social management and decision-making poses fundamentally new challenges to the law, associated not only with the risk of algorithmic discrimination, but also with the transformation of ideas about social justice, equality of access to digital goods, and the balance of public and private interests in the digital environment [28,29,30]. The human-centric dimension of legal regulation requires considering algorithmic systems through the prism of their impact on the dignity of a person, the possibility of self-realization and participation in public life, since it is automated decisions that increasingly determine access to education, labour, financial resources and social services [31,32]. Within the framework of the human-centric doctrine of legal regulation of AI, the key task of the state is not only to formally ensure equal access to digital services, but also to create conditions for preventing hidden forms of discrimination that may arise because of opaque algorithmic models, data unevenness, or technical biases [33]. In this context, the law is designed to ensure the establishment of the principle of algorithmic justice, which provides for the mandatory verification of artificial intelligence systems for the impact on various social groups,

as well as the formation of legal mechanisms capable of ensuring that automated decisions do not lead to a narrowing of the content and scope of human rights and freedoms.

Legal support in this area should be considered as a multidimensional system of legal guarantees aimed at preventing human rights violations in the context of algorithmic management of social processes [34]. It should include not only the establishment of procedures for assessing the impact of algorithms on human rights, but also the institutionalization of continuous monitoring of their functioning, the creation of independent audit mechanisms, as well as the consolidation of a real and effective right of a person to review and appeal automated decisions. In the human-centered paradigm, the transparency of educational data, their legal legitimacy, and compliance with the principles of non-discrimination are of particular importance, because it is at the stage of dataset formation that potential risks of algorithmic bias are laid. Therefore, the law should ensure not only the technical verification of models, but also the regulatory consolidation of the obligation of developers and operators of artificial intelligence systems to prove the absence of discriminatory effects, which will contribute to the establishment of the principle of algorithmic fairness and strengthen trust in digital technologies.

The human-centered approach requires that any technological innovation be evaluated not only from the standpoint of its technical efficiency or economic feasibility, but primarily through the prism of impact on human dignity, freedom of expression, autonomy of the individual and equality before the law. In this sense, law should act as an instrument of preventive control, capable of ensuring a balance between innovative development and the inviolability of fundamental human rights. It is about the formation of a normative model, within which the implementation of algorithmic systems is accompanied by an assessment of social and legal risks, an analysis of potential consequences for vulnerable groups of the population, and the establishment of mandatory guarantees of transparency and accountability of technology developers. Providing such guarantees will contribute not only to the formation of trust in AI as a social institution, but also to the establishment of legal certainty in the context of digital transformation, which will allow integrating technological solutions into the legal system without violating the basic principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law and preserving the priority of a person as a central value of the modern legal order.

To date, in the open legal literature (Ukrainian and international), there are no clear established definitions of such categories as "*AI legal reality*", "*AI environment*", "*AI space*" or "*AI reality*" in the classical normative or doctrinal sense. Scientific papers develop definitions of AI itself, its legal personality, responsibility, legal regime or regulatory models, but not the metacategories of "reality" or "space" as legal phenomena.

Why are there no metacategories of "SHIreality"? Perhaps this is because even the very concept of "AI" is legally contradictory and instrumental: in the EU AI Act, it serves as an "empty container" for risk-oriented regulation, and not an ontological category of reality [35]. Theoretical models focus on "**legal disruption**", i.e. the ways in which AI changes existing institutions (development, displacement, destruction of norms), rather than on the formation of an independent "legal space of AI" [36]. Lawyers are still striving to adapt existing concepts (legal personality, tort, contract, jurisdiction), and not to build a new ontology of "digital/AI reality" as a separate legal being [37,38,39,40].

This means that these concepts are in the zone of doctrinal construction, and not of established positive law. Since they describe not an object, but an ontological level of interaction between law and technology."

Let's offer the author's definitions:

The legal reality of AI is a normatively defined set of legal relations and legal regimes that arise because of autonomous algorithmic data processing, within which the results of the functioning of intelligent systems acquire legal significance through the procedures of verification, responsibility and regulation of the life cycle of such systems, regardless of the physical environment of their functioning

The AI environment is a normatively constructed set of legal relations, legal regimes and legal states arising as a result of autonomous algorithmic data processing, within which the results of the functioning of intelligent systems are recognized as legally significant, subject to procedural verification, legal assessment and liability regime, and are also regulated by the norms of information and digital law regardless of the physical environment of operation of such systems.

The AI space is a transnational information sphere and a normatively defined segment of cyberspace, within which autonomous algorithmic interaction of subjects and computing systems is carried out, and the norms of information and digital law apply directly to machine processes, the results of their functioning and related legal relations in the conditions of the conditional territory of digital jurisdiction, which is not tied to physical state borders.

AI reality is an artificially formed information and digital reality that arises because of machine interpretation of data and algorithmic modelling of social processes, within which the results of the functioning of intelligent systems can acquire legal significance, influence legal relations and form the cognitive and information layer of society.

The analysis of scientific sources shows that the modern legal doctrine focuses mainly on the definition of artificial intelligence itself, its status, responsibility and risk-based regulation, but does not systematically operate with the categories of "reality", "space" or "environment" as legal phenomena. This creates a unique field for the formation of copyright definitions within the framework of information law and the theory of digital jurisdiction.

In the future architecture of digital law, these four concepts can fulfil different levels of ontology: legal reality is the normative level, the environment is functional, space is structural, and AI reality is philosophical-ontological."

Conclusions.

The information society, which today actively demonstrates certain positive features in terms of its existence and development, in particular, the formation of the information unity of human civilization, free access to information resources, and even in the field of law, is technologically evolving, at the same time becoming a factor of social progress, but contains certain threats and challenges that the scientific community should pay attention to today.

The formation and development of the global space of artificial intelligence requires ensuring proper legal regulation both at the international and national levels and can also be the subject of scientific understanding within the framework of established social and legal communication.

Without denying the fact that the legal regulation of artificial intelligence space can and should have certain features, we focus on the unacceptability of its separation from generally accepted canons, norms and mechanisms of legal regulation. Departure from the established legal foundations in the field of legal regulation may lead to a fragmented or isolated perception of the legal regime of AI or equate its regulation only to a partial involvement with general legal principles and doctrinal principles (ideas), as well as with specific prescriptions of law.

The human-centric dimension of the activity of artificial intelligence should, first, be justified by an appropriate doctrine aimed at eliminating ambiguous interpretations due to its functioning. We are talking about the transformation of ideas about generational human rights, the need to develop our own national strategy for the development of artificial intelligence, as well as the formation of a new understanding of the nature of collective and individual human rights in the context of digitalization.

It is advisable to devote a separate vector of system analysis to the problems of legal support of permissible legal and unacceptable non-legal interference with human rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. In this context, the space of artificial intelligence is associated with the emergence of a new socio-legal category (phenomenon) – "digital dictatorship".

One of the important issues that is already being discussed by the scientific community is the feasibility and possibility of adopting the Digital Code, its role and significance in streamlining the legal regulation of AI in space.

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